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The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if 
participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they 
should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that 
individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that 
participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. 
By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies 
the delegation of public goods provision to a profit-maximizing firm. This also makes 
participation constraints desirable. 
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Should public goods be nanced solely out of voluntary contributions or is there a role for
taxes as a source of public goods nance? The disadvantage of a system based on voluntary
contributions is that public goods are underprovided because voluntary contributions tend to
neglect the social benets of increased public goods provision. By contrast, a system based on
taxes which are raised independently of an individual's valuation of public goods can provide
sucient funds for ecient public goods provision. However, if individuals can be forced to pay
for public goods that they do not value, this coercive power may also be abused. If politicians,
bureaucrats or managers can use funds from the public budget to nance projects, their choices
may be biased towards their private interests.
This paper formalizes a tradeo between the eciency of public goods provision, on the one
hand, and protection against an abuse of coercive power, on the other. It asks the question
under what circumstances coercion is legitimate in the sense that it makes individuals, by and
large, better o even though occasionally they will be forced to pay for a public good that
they do not value. Broadly speaking, the main result is that if public goods are provided by a
benevolent Pigouvian planner, then individuals are happy to equip this institution with coercive
power. Being benevolent, it will use the instruments at its disposal in the individuals' best
interests, which implies that public goods are provided eciently. By contrast, if public goods
are provided by a malevolent planner who seeks to maximize its own payo at the expense of
individuals, individuals prefer public goods provision based on voluntary contributions.
The result shows that at the heart of the question whether or not the use of coercion is legiti-
mate is a distributive conict. Both a malevolent Leviathan and a benevolent Pigouvian planner
will provide a surplus-maximizing amount of public goods if coercion is possible. However, the
malevolent Leviathan will keep the entire surplus for himself so that individuals will not benet
from public goods provision at all. Voluntary public goods nance, by contrast, leaves them at
least a positive share of the surplus, albeit a smaller one.
This paper contributes to the literature on public goods provision under conditions of incomplete
information about public goods preferences. This literature has arrived at two major results.
On the one hand, there is a possibility result: It is possible to reach an ecient allocation of
public goods, even if individuals have private information on their preferences.1 On the other
hand, there is an impossibility result: Ecient outcomes are out of reach if participation con-
straints have to be respected, so that each individual has to be better o relative to a status
1This result is due to d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979). For a more recent generaliza-
tion, see d'Aspremont et al. (2004).
1quo allocation without public goods provision.2
This literature confronts us with a choice between outcomes that are ecient and second-best
outcomes that avoid the use of coercion. The contribution of the present paper is to answer the
question how this choice should be made; i.e., we clarify under which conditions the objective
to reach ecient outcomes justies the use of coercion.
Our answer to this question is based on a constitutional choice perspective; that is, we make
the following thought experiment: Suppose there is an ex ante stage at which individuals have
not yet discovered what their preferences are. More specically, an individual's objective is to
maximize expected utility, with expectations taken about her future preferences. At this ex
ante stage, individuals decide about the rules according to which public goods are provided.
In particular, they face a choice between a strong and a weak formulation of participation
constraints. The strong formulation requires that, at the interim stage, where individuals have
discovered their preferences, each individual benets from public goods provision. The weak
version requires only that individuals benet from public goods provision at the ex ante stage.
To illustrate this by means of an example, think of the construction of a bridge, and suppose
that there are individuals who cross the bridge frequently and others who do so only rarely.
If we impose participation constraints in the weak, ex ante sense, this allows us to force the
non-frequent users to contribute to the nancing of the bridge, provided that their utility loss is
compensated for by the utility gain of the frequent users. By contrast, if we impose participation
constraints in the strong, ex interim sense, we lose this opportunity. In this case, the less frequent
users must also be made better o by the construction of the bridge, which implies that they
cannot be forced to pay for a bridge that they hardly ever use.
We say that coercion is legitimate if, at the constitutional stage, individuals opt for partici-
pation constraints in the weak sense.
We approach the question whether coercion and hence ecient public goods provision is le-
gitimate from two dierent angles.
First, we take a mechanism design perspective. With this approach, we arrive at the con-
clusion that strong participation constraints, which protect individuals from having to pay for
a public good that they do not value, should be imposed if and only if there is a pronounced
agency conict between individuals and the mechanism designer.3 The logic is as follows: While
strong participation constraints have detrimental consequences from an eciency perspective,
2See G uth and Hellwig (1986), Rob (1989), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), Hellwig (2003), or Neeman (2004).
3Hellwig (2003) studies public goods provision by a benevolent mechanism designer who faces participation
constraints in the strong sense. Our result shows that such a mechanism design problem cannot occur if the
relevant constraints are endogenized by means of a constitutional decision at the ex ante stage.
2they also imply that individuals can at least realize an information rent. If the mechanism de-
signer's objective is to extract the surplus from public goods provision (and hence to minimize
the expected payo of individuals), then the imposition of strong participation constraints is
desirable because individuals prefer getting an information rent over not getting anything.
Based on this answer, we turn to the more fundamental question where such an agency con-
ict should come from. To motivate this question, suppose for a moment that at the constitu-
tional stage individuals could not only choose between strong and weak participation constraints,
but that they could also specify the mechanism designer's objective function. Obviously, they
would opt for a benevolent mechanism designer who maximizes the expected payo of individu-
als. As a consequence, individuals would be happy to remove any constraint from the mechanism
designer's problem. In particular, they would be willing to accept that they occasionally have
to pay for a public good that they do not value. Hence, the use of coercion would be legitimate
and eciency could be achieved.
While this reasoning may seem somewhat contrived, it raises the question whether we can
provide a more plausible \microfoundation" for agency conicts that make strong participation
constraints desirable. In the second part of the paper, we show that there is a positive answer
to this question, and moreover, that giving such a positive answer requires us to leave the
mechanism design framework and to adopt instead an incomplete contracts perspective.
More specically, the second part of the paper is based on an extended model in which there
are not only individuals with private information about their preferences but also a rm which
produces the public good and has private information about its technology. In this environment,
a mechanism design approach leads to complete contingent planning, i.e., to a specication of
public goods production and individual payments as a function of the individuals' public goods
preferences and the rm's technology. Again, we obtain the result that if the mechanism designer
is suciently benevolent, then the use of coercion is justied so that eciency can be reached.
We contrast this with the following incomplete contracts model: There is a regulator who
delegates public goods provision to the rm, i.e., he sells the right to produce the public good
and to collect payments from individuals to the rm. Afterwards, the rm becomes residual
claimant; i.e., the rm communicates with individuals about their preferences and organizes
public goods supply so that its prots are maximized. From the regulator's perspective, this
arrangement is incomplete in the sense that he remains ignorant with respect to public goods
preferences. His interaction with the rm can at most be contingent on the rms's technology.
We show that this approach may indeed leave so much discretion to the rm that it is able
to extract the entire surplus from public goods provision. Consequently, individuals prefer the
imposition of strong participation constraints, i.e., in the incomplete contracts model, the use
of coercion is not legitimate.
3To sum up, the analysis shows that, unless there are pronounced conicts of interests be-
tween the consumers of a public good and the institution which is organizing its supply, coercion
is legitimate and an ecient supply of public goods is possible. By contrast, if there are such
conicts, strong participation constraints should protect individuals against an abuse of coercive
power. Finally, it is shown that the delegation of public goods provision to a prot-maximizing
rm generates a case in which individuals should be protected: a prot-maximizing rm should
not be given the possibility to charge individuals in excess of their willingness to pay, even if
this comes at the cost of an inecient public goods supply.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a more detailed
literature review. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 establishes the result that the le-
gitimacy of coercion depends on the mechanism designer's degree of benevolence. An extended
model in which public goods provision is delegated to a rm with private information about its
technology is analyzed in Section 5. The last section contains concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
The paper contributes to the literature on public goods provision under the assumption that
individuals have private information on their preferences. For a model with independent private
values, d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979) have shown that an ecient
allocation of public goods can be implemented as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. However, this
outcome is out of reach if, in addition, ex interim participation constraints are imposed. This
has been established by G uth and Hellwig (1986) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990).4 This
impossibility result has led various authors to study second-best problems where public goods
provision is subject to ex interim participation constraints. In particular, G uth and Hellwig
(1986) and Schmitz (1997) study public goods provision by a prot-maximizing monopolist,
and Hellwig (2003) and Norman (2004) study public goods provision by a benevolent utilitarian
planner.
This paper contributes to this literature in various respects. First, it provides an answer to
the question whether, from a normative perspective, strong participation constraints should be
imposed, even if this implies that ecient outcomes cannot be reached. This question has not
been asked before.
Second, the paper makes a technical contribution to the study of second-best problems. Most
of the existing literature assumes that an individual's public goods preferences are the realiza-
4These papers show that a version of the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) theorem on the impossibility of
ecient trade holds in an economy with public goods.
4tion of a continuous random variable. This paper, by contrast, works under the assumption
of a discrete number of types (where the number of possible types may be arbitrarily large).
While this has no bearing on the results of the analysis, the model with a discrete set of types
has two major advantages. There is no need to impose dierentiability and continuity assump-
tions to make the mechanism design problem tractable. Also, it becomes more explicit which
incentive compatibility constraints are binding and which ones are slack, which leads to a better
understanding of the tradeos which shape the optimal mechanism.
Finally, it uses ideas from the literature on incomplete contracts to show that the delegation
of public goods provision to a prot-maximizing rm yields a situation in which the imposition
of strong participation constraints is desirable.5 It thereby bridges two dierent literatures that
are both relevant for public goods provision, and which are typically treated separately; namely
the literature on the revelation of public goods preferences (which is a major topic in theoreti-
cal public economics) and the literature on the regulation of rms who are in charge of public
production (which is a major topic in industrial organization).6
This work is also related to two recent papers in which participation constraints play a sig-
nicant role.
Gr uner (2008) asks the question whether an ecient allocation of public goods can be
achieved with a dierent set of participation constraints. He requires that each individual is
made better o relative to a situation with majority voting about public goods provision. In
this model, ecient public goods provision is possible. This result is given a positive interpre-
tation; i.e., it explains why despite the impossibility results in the existing literature, public
goods are provided in the real world and why these outcomes may even be ecient: In the real
world the status quo outcome is shaped by democratic institutions. The present paper oers
an alternative positive explanation. Individuals may be willing to accept that, occasionally,
they have to pay for public goods that they do not value if, on average, they benet from the
provision of public goods. This leads to a weaker notion of participation constraints, so that
ecient outcomes can be achieved.
Acemoglu et al. (2008) compare public and private provision of insurance contracts. They
formalize the following tradeo: private provision suers from ineciencies due to participation
constraints. These problems may be overcome by state provision of insurance, given that the
state has coercive power. The disadvantage of state provision, however, is that the coercive
power may be abused by selsh politicians. The tradeo \markets versus governments" therefore
5For an overview of the incomplete contracts approach, see Hellwig (1996) and Tirole (1999).
6The seminal article in the latter branch of the literature is Baron and Myerson (1982). For a textbook
treatment and a literature survey, see Laont and Tirole (1993).
5becomes a tradeo between distortions due to participation constraints and distortions due
to agency problems between citizens and politicians. While this tradeo seems empirically
plausible, the present paper shows that, from a normative perspective, agency problems are
what justies the imposition of participation constraints. Hence, why should the state be given
coercive power if politicians are not acting in the citizen's interest? The normative analysis
in this paper suggests that the state should have coercive power only if the agency problems
between citizens and politicians are less signicant than the agency problems between private
providers of insurance and their customers.
3 The environment
There is a nite set of individuals, I = f1;:::;ng. The preferences of individual i are given by
the utility function
ui = iq   ti;
where q 2 R+ is the provision level of a public good, ti is individual i's contribution to the cost
of public good provision and i is a taste parameter that aects individual i's valuation of the
public good. For each i, i belongs to a nite ordered set  = f0;1;:::;mg, with 0 = 0. We
assume that l   l 1 = 1, for all l. We denote a vector of all individual taste parameters by
 = (1;:::;n).
From an ex ante perspective, the taste parameters of individuals are independent and iden-
tically distributed random variables that take values in . For any i, we denote the probability
that i = l by pl. The following notation will prove helpful. For every i, let p(i) be a random
variable that takes the value pl if i takes the value l and P(i) be a random variable that takes
the value
Pl
k=0 pk if i takes the value l. Dene hl =
1 P(l)
p(l) . In the literature this fraction
is known as the hazard rate. We assume that the hazard rate is decreasing, hl < hl 1, for all
l  1. This assumption is imposed in the following without further mention.
We study public goods provision from an interim perspective, i.e., after individuals have
learned what their preferences are. With an appeal to the Revelation Principle we limit attention
to direct mechanisms and to truthful Bayes-Nash equilibria. A direct mechanism consists of a
provision rule for the public good and, for each individual i, a payment rule. The provision
rule is a function q : n ! R+ that species a public good provision level as a function of the
preferences that individuals communicate to the mechanism designer. Analogously, the payment
rule for individual i is a function ti : n ! R.
A mechanism has to satisfy participation constraints, incentive compatibility constraints and
a budget constraint. The budget constraint requires that expected payments of individuals are







 E[k(q())] : (1)
where k is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function with k(0) = 0, limq!0 k0(q) = 0,
and limq!1 k0(q) = 1.  is a parameter that, for the moment, is treated as commonly known.8
The expectations operator E applies to the vector  of all individual taste parameters.
The incentive compatibility constraints ensure that that truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equi-
librium: given that all other individuals reveal their taste parameter, the best response of
individual i is to reveal the own taste parameter as well. Formally, for each i, for each i 2 ,
and for each ^ i 2 ,
iQi(i)   Ti(i)  iQi(^ i)   Ti(^ i); (2)
where
Qi(^ i) := E[q( i; ^ i) j ^ i]
is the expected level of public good provision from the perspective of individual i, given that all
other individuals reveal their preferences to the mechanism designer and individual i announces
^ i. Likewise,
Ti(^ i) = E[q( i; ^ i) j ^ i]
is i's expected payment.
A mechanism also has to satisfy participation constraints which ensure that individuals
benet from the provision of the public good. We distinguish between participation constraints
at the ex interim state or at the ex ante stage. The ex interim participation constraints are as
follows: For all i, and all i,
iQi(i)   Ti(i)  0: (3)
These constraints ensure that, after all individuals have discovered what their public goods
preferences are, no individual is worse o relative to a status quo situation in which the public
good is not provided. An alternative interpretation is that individuals are given veto rights that
protect them from having to pay for a public good that they do not value. Consequently, a
deviation from the status quo requires a unanimous agreement to provide the public good.
7It has been shown by d'Aspremont et al. (2004) that to any incentive compatible mechanism that satises the
budget constraint in expectation there exists a payo equivalent incentive compatible mechanism that satises
budget balance in an ex post sense, i.e.,
Pn
i=1 ti()  k(q()), for every . Hence, working with budget balance
in expectation is without loss of generality.
8In Section 5 we will assume that the supplier of the public good has private information on .
7The ex ante participation constraints require that, for all i,
E[iq()   ti()]  0 ; (4)
so that each individual benets from public good provision at an ex ante stage, i.e., prior to
learning what the own preferences are. These participation constraints are less restrictive than
those in (3). To make this more explicit we can use the law of iterated expectations to write (4)
as follows: for all i,
m X
l=0
pl(lQi(l)   Ti(l))  0 :
Consequently, the ex ante participation constraints in (4) require that the ex interim partici-
pation constraints in (3) hold \on average", but not necessarily for each possible realization of
individual i's preferences.
These constraints in (4) ensure that the provision of the public good is a Pareto-improvement
if considered behind a \veil of ignorance" where individuals can form an expectation about how
the public good is going to aect their well-being, but are not yet fully informed about their
preferences. They make it possible to rely on coercion when nancing the provision of a public
good. Individuals can be forced to pay for a public good that they do not value, provided
that, behind the veil of ignorance, they benet from public goods provision. The participation
constraints in (3), by contrast, exclude coercion under each and every circumstance. We can
therefore interpret them as providing a maximal protection of economic freedom: No one may
interfere with an individual's decision to spend his money on the uses that are most attractive
to him.
The analysis focusses on the question whether the use of coercion is benecial for individuals.
To this end we will compare mechanisms where the ex ante participation constraints have to
be satised to mechanisms where the ex interim participation constraints are imposed. The
standard of comparison is the ex ante expected utility of individuals. If this utility is larger
with ex ante participation constraints, then we say that the use of coercion is legitimate in the
sense that if, behind a veil of ignorance, individuals were confronted with a constitutional choice
about the use of coercion, they would unanimously vote in favor of it.
3.1 The tradeo between eciency and voluntary participation
We will show in the following that there eciency is compatible with participation constraints
at the ex ante stage but not with participation constraints at the ex interim stage.
We say that a mechanism (q;t1;:::;tn) is constrained ecient if it is incentive compatible and
budgetary feasible, and there is no other incentive compatible and budgetary feasible mechanism
8(q0;t0
1;:::;t0
n), such that for all i, E[iq0()   t0
i()]  E[iq()   ti()], with a strict inequality
for some i.9
Proposition 1 A mechanism is constrained ecient if and only if the budget condition (1)
holds as an equality and the public goods provision rule is surplus-maximizing; i.e., for every ,
q() is chosen so as to maximize (
Pn
i=1 i)q()   k(q()).
It is well known that, under conditions of complete information, surplus maximization in con-
junction with budget balance is both necessary and sucient for Pareto-eciency if preferences
are quasilinear in money. Proposition 1 shows that the same is true with private information
on public goods preferences, i.e., private information on preferences does not alter the eciency
conditions.10
The main step in the proof of the Proposition, which can be found in the Appendix, is to show
that to any mechanism that is ecient in the set of allocations that are budgetary feasible (but
not necessarily incentive compatible) there exists a budgetary feasible and incentive compatible
mechanism that leads, for all individuals, to the same level of ex ante expected utility. Intuitively,
incentive compatibility is a condition that aects how expected utility increases ex interim with
an individual's valuation of the public good.11 However, this is no restriction on the \base
utility",
0Qi(0)   Ti(0) =  Ti(0);
to which these increments are added. Hence, upon manipulating Ti(0) one can generate any
level of E[iq()   ti()] in an incentive compatible way.
In particular, the if-part of Proposition 1 implies that there exists a constrained ecient
allocation such that the surplus from public goods provision is shared equally among individuals,
i.e., such that the ex ante expected utility of each individual i is equal to










9It should be noted that this denition of eciency is based on the ex ante expected payo of individuals.
This eciency criterion, which implies the desirability of surplus maximization, is predominant in the literature.
However, one could also dene an ex interim notion of Pareto eciency, see Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), and
Ledyard and Palfrey (1999) for an application to public goods provision.
10It has been shown by d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979) that surplus maximization
can be achieved, given the requirement of incentive compatibility. Proposition 1 is more general. It shows that
surplus maximization is both necessary and sucient for constrained eciency.
11 To see that interim utility is increasing note that the incentive compatibility conditions imply that, for each










9where q is the surplus-maximizing provision rule. In the following we will refer to this mecha-
nism as the symmetric constrained ecient mechanism.
Obviously, since the expected surplus from public good provision is strictly positive, under
the symmetric constrained ecient mechanism all ex ante participation constraints hold as a
strict inequality. This shows that there is no conict between eciency on the one hand and
the imposition of ex ante participation constraints on the other. If the expected benets from
public goods provision are evenly distributed, then every individual is made better o by public
good provision.12 We summarize these observations in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 There exists a constrained ecient mechanism that satises the ex ante partici-
pation constraints.
By contrast, eciency may be out of reach with ex interim participation constraints.
Proposition 2 There exists a constrained ecient mechanism that satises the interim partic-












 E[k(q())] : (5)
The inequality in (5) is violated if the number of individuals is suciently large.13 The intuition
is that, as the number of individual's increases, each single individual's inuence on the public
goods provision level becomes smaller and smaller, so that it becomes more and more attractive
to articulate a low taste parameter in order to mitigate the own contribution to the cost of
public good provision. Hence, with more individuals it is more dicult to raise enough money
for ecient public goods provision.14
3.2 Sketch of the Proof of Proposition 2
A formal proof of Proposition 2 can be found in the Appendix. In the following the argument is
sketched. The proof is based on a characterization of revenue-maximizing mechanisms, i.e., of
mechanisms that maximize E[
Pn
i=1 ti()], taking the public goods provision rule q as given, and
12There exist constrained-ecient mechanisms that violate these constraints. Given that utility is perfectly
transferrable between individuals, eciency can also be achieved if one individual is made very badly-o and
receives a negative expected payo.
13A proof of this claim can be found in the supplementary material for this paper.
14For a model so that i is distributed according to an atomless probability distribution, this impossibility result
holds irrespective of the number of individuals, see Hellwig (2003).
10uses arguments that are familiar from the analysis of optimal non-linear pricing mechanisms.15
In particular, a \relaxed revenue maximization problem" is studied, which takes only a subset
of all constraints into account, namely the ex interim participation constraints and the local
downward incentive compatibility constraints,
lQi(l)   Ti(l)  lQi(l 1)   Ti(l 1) ;
for all i and l. The observation, that ex interim expected utility is increasing in i (see footnote
11) then implies that only the participation constraints for types i = 0 need to be taken
explicitly into account. If these are satised, then those for higher types are automatically
satised as well. A further observation is that the participation constraints for i = 0 and
all downward incentive compatibility constraints have to be binding. Otherwise, taking the
provision rule for the public good as xed, it would be possible to increase the expected payments
of some types of some individuals without violating any one of the constraints of the relaxed
problem. Given this pattern of binding constraints, it is possible to solve for the expected





























is an upper bound on the revenues that can be
raised if public goods are provided according to q. Constrained eciency is therefore pos-
sible only if these maximal revenues exceed the expected cost from public good provision,
E[k(q())].
The if-part of the Proposition establishes that this upper bound can actually be reached if
all incentive compatibility constraints; i.e., not only the local downward ones, are taken into
account. By well-known arguments from the analysis of incentive constraints, this is the case if
the public goods provision rule satises the following monotonicity constraint: For all i and l,
Qi(l)  Qi(l 1). Obviously, this monotonicity property is satised by the surplus-maximizing
provision rule q, which is strictly increasing in every individual's taste parameter.
The expression for maximal revenues is interpreted as follows: individuals have to be granted
rents because they have private information about their preferences. This implies, in particular,
that a revenue-maximizing mechanism is unable to extract the whole expected surplus from
public goods provision which equals E [
Pn
i=1 iq()]. As we show in the supplementary material






. An inspection of (5) reveals that the sum of these informational rents
reduces the revenues that can be extracted from individuals.
15See Mussa and Rosen (1978), Matthews and Moore (1987), or Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
113.3 Benevolent Second-best Mechanisms
The observation that ex interim participation constraints may imply that eciency cannot be
reached has led various authors to study second best mechanisms. Typically, the objective is to
maximize expected utilitarian welfare, E [
Pn
i=1(iq()   ti())], subject to the budget constraint
(1), the incentive compatibility constraints (2), and the ex interim participation constraints (3).
For brevity, we refer to this problem in the following as the benevolent second best problem.
Proposition 3 If condition (5) holds, then the symmetric constrained ecient mechanism
solves the benevolent second best problem. Otherwise, each individual is, in terms of ex ante
expected utility, strictly worse o.
The Proposition, which is proven in the Appendix, shows that from a normative perspective, the
imposition of ex interim participation constraints is undesirable. These constraints are never
benecial but sometimes harmful, depending on whether or not the inequality in (5) holds.
Hence, if individuals were given a choice between the imposition of participation constraints at
the ex interim or the ex ante stage they would unanimously opt for the latter. Put dierently,
at the ex ante stage, individuals are happy to accept that they occasionally will have to pay for
public goods that they do not value if they are assured that their share of the expected surplus
from public goods provision is suciently high. However, these results rely on the assumption
that the mechanism designer is benevolent. In the following section we relax this assumption.
As will become clear, this may give rise to a role for the imposition of participation constraints
at the ex interim stage.
4 Conicts of interest
In the following, we allow for the possibility that the mechanism designer does not only care
about the expected payos of individuals, but also derives utility from resources that he extracts
for himself. In particular, we will formulate a model in which we can vary the mechanism
designer's degree of benevolence. With this model we will ultimately show that coercion is
legitimate if and only if the mechanism designer is suciently benevolent.
Formally, we assume that the public good is provided by a mechanism designer whose ob-







  E[k(q())] : (6)
However, there is a fraction a fraction  of prots that are redistributed to individuals in a lump
sum fashion. We treat  as a given parameter which measures the mechanism designer's degree of
12benevolence. As will become clear, low values of  indicate that the mechanism designer extracts
a large fraction of the surplus from public good provision, whereas a high value of  indicates
that any surplus extracted will be transferred back to individuals. For ease of exposition, all
individuals are entitled to the same fraction of prots. The per capita share of prots is therefore
equal to 
n.
The interaction between the mechanism and the individuals who consume the public good
proceeds as follows. First, prior to the operation of the mechanism, the mechanism designer
makes an unconditional lump sum payment of 
n to each individual, where  are the ex-
pected prots that result from the prot-maximization problem. After this payment is made, a
mechanism is chosen in order to maximize  subject to the incentive compatibility constraints
in (2), and participation constraints. Again, the participation constraints are either imposed at
the ex ante stage as in (4), or at the ex interim stage as in (3).
Remark 1 Imposing a sequential structure where expected prots are distributed prior to the
operation of the mechanism has the following convenient implication: Prots do not enter the
incentive compatibility constraints because the upfront transfer is not conditional on the behavior
of individuals under the mechanism. In part B of the Appendix, we discuss an alternative
version of the model in which prots are not redistributed ex ante (before the operation of the









In the supplementary material for this paper, it is shown that the above sequential structure can
be imposed without loss of generality: The outcome of the model with a redistribution of prots
after the operation of the mechanism can be replicated by the model with an upfront transfer of
expected prots prior to the operation of the mechanism.
Remark 2 The individuals' share of expected prots does not enter the participation constraints.
This may be questioned on the following grounds. The participation constraints serve to ensure
that individuals are not worse o as compared to a status quo situation with no public goods
provision. If their share of monopoly prots provides them with utility that they would not be
able to realize in the status quo, then this should be included in the utility that they derive from
public goods provision. Accordingly, the appropriate version of, say, the ex interim participation
constraints would be as follows; for all i, and all i,
iQi(i)   Ti(i) +

n
  0: (7)
Again, it turns out that the specication with participation constraints as in (7) can be interpreted
13as a special case of the model with the participation constraints that do not include monopoly
prots. This is also claried in the supplementary material.
The following Proposition compares, for an arbitrary individual i, ex ante expected utility with
ex interim participation constraints, V int
i , and ex ante participation constraints, V ant
i . If V ant
i is
larger than V int
i then the use of coercion is legitimate in the sense that the individual in question
is, in an ex ante sense, made better o if coercion is possible.
Proposition 4 Public goods provision is surplus-maximizing with ex ante participation con-
straints and distorted downwards with ex interim participation constraints. Moreover, there
exists ^  2 (0;1) such that V ant
i () > V int
i () if and only if  > ^ .
The Proposition shows that the legitimacy of coercion depends on the mechanism designer's
degree of benevolence. If it is high, then expected payos with coercion are close to the sym-
metric constrained ecient mechanism. In this case, the imposition of ex interim participation
constraints is harmful for individuals because it results in a lower level of aggregate surplus.
By contrast, for a low degree of benevolence, individuals prefer the imposition of ex interim
participation constraints, even though this implies that public goods provision is inecient.
Given that the mechanism designer retains almost the whole surplus, they cannot benet from
surplus-maximizing public goods provision. The only remaining source of payos is therefore
the information rent that individuals can reap provided that ex interim participation constraints
are imposed. Hence, they prefer a larger fraction of a smaller, second-best surplus over a smaller
fraction of the maximal, rst best surplus.
This result can be summarized as follows. If public goods are provided in a benevolent
way, the use of coercion is legitimate. A benevolent mechanism designer acts in the interests of
individuals and should hence face as few constraints as possible. By contrast, if a malevolent
institution is in charge of public goods provision then the use of coercion is not legitimate.
A malevolent mechanism designer maximizes its own well-being at the expense of individuals.
Hence, it is in the interest of individuals that he faces as many constraints as possible.
4.1 Sketch of the Proof of Proposition 4
The proof follows from the characterization of the optimal mechanism with ex interim and ex
ante participation constraints, respectively, which we sketch below. A complete proof is in the
Appendix.
Ex interim participation constraints. Consider rst the mechanism designer's problem
with ex interim participation constraints. Once upfront payments to individuals are made, the
14mechanism designer aims at surplus extraction. Whatever his provision rule is, he will therefore
choose the payments of individuals so that expected revenues E [
Pn
i=1 ti()] are maximized.
This problem of revenue maximization, see the discussion following Proposition 2, yields the

































We denote this provision rule in the following by q
 . With this second best provision rule,
public goods provision is, for every , distorted downwards relative to the surplus-maximizing
level. This follows since q










whereas the surplus-maximizing provision level is given by
Pn
i=1 i = k0(q()).
The expected payos of individuals, from the ex ante perspective are derived as follows:







; second, they get a fraction 
n of the second-best prot. After algebraic ma-
nipulations which make use of the assumption that the individuals' taste parameters are iid
random variables, we can therefore derive the following expression for individual i's expected
payo,
V int
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Hence, an individual's expected payo is a convex combination of the expected prot that is
transferred to individuals and the information rent. In particular, the smaller , i.e., the smaller
the fraction of prots that is transferred to individuals, the larger is the contribution of the
information rent to the individuals' expected payo.
Ex ante participation constraints. The mechanism designer now aims at surplus maxi-
mization subject to ex ante participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints.
However, to characterize the outcome of this mechanism design problem, we may ignore the
incentive constraints. As was we already pointed out in the discussion of Proposition 1, incentive
compatibility constraints have no bearing on the ex ante expected utility levels. Consequently,
if there is some mechanism that satises the budget constraint and guarantees individuals some
15non-negative expected utility level, then there is also another mechanism that generates these
expected utility levels and is, in addition, incentive compatible.
Obviously, at a solution to the mechanism design problem, all ex ante participation con-
straints are binding. This implies that, for each individual i, E[ti()] = E[iq()]. Upon
substituting these expected payments in the mechanism designer's objective function, we nd














i.e., he chooses to provide public goods in a surplus-maximizing way.
Given that, with ex ante participation constraints, individuals are unable to reap an infor-
mation rent, their expected payo from the ex ante perspective consists entirely of their share
of the rst surplus which is given by
V ant










Note that, whatever , the mechanism designer chooses to provide public goods according to
q, i.e., public goods provision is surplus-maximizing. Hence, the parameter  only aects the
distribution of the surplus between the mechanism designer and the individuals, but has no
bearing on the public goods provision rule. In particular, if  is close to zero, the expected
payo of individuals is close to zero.
5 Endogenous Conicts of Interest
In the previous section we did not treat the mechanism designer's degree of benevolence  as
a choice variable, but rather as a parameter that makes it possible to dene formally what
benevolence and malevolence mean. Obviously, if there was a choice of , then a complete
redistribution of prots would be the ideal outcome. There is nothing better than the use of
coercion in conjunction with a benevolent mechanism designer. But this raises the question
whether we can nd a more convincing case for participation constraints. The analysis so far
has only shown that the imposition of participation constraint is justied if, for some reason,
the ideal outcome is out of reach.
This issue is taken up in the following. The aim is to develop a more microfounded model
of public goods provision that is empirically plausible and, moreover, endogenously creates a
distributive conict that justies the imposition of strong participation constraints.
More specically, we study an extended model in which the public good is produced by
a rm with private information about its cost function. As a benchmark, we rst study the
implications of this extension for a model of mechanism design. We will see that if there is a
16mechanism designer who engages in complete contingent planning of public goods production
and individual payments, then we obtain the same results as in the benchmark model with a
commonly known technology: Coercion is legitimate if and only if the mechanism designer is
suciently benevolent.
We will then contrast this result with the following incomplete contracts model: A regulator
delegates public goods production to a prot-maximizing rm, possibly in exchange for an
upfront payment that the rm has to make and which is then transferred to individuals. This
interaction is incomplete, relative to the mechanism design benchmark, because the regulator
remains ignorant with respect to the individuals' preferences. The ne-tuning of public goods
supply and of individual payments to the state of demand lies in the hands of a prot-maximizing
rm. We show that the rm may be able to extract the whole surplus from public goods
provision, and that this may imply that strong participation constraints should be imposed.
5.1 Mechanism Design
We assume that the rm producing the public good has private information on the parameter
 in the cost function. From an ex ante perspective, the cost parameter  is a random variable
that takes values in a nite ordered set f1;:::;rg, with 1 = r, 2 = r 1, :::, r = 1. Hence,
a rm with cost parameter 1 has the worst technology. The probability that  equals j is in
the following denoted by f(j) = fj. We assume that the random variable  is stochastically
independent of the vector of taste parameters . We impose another monotone hazard rate
assumption: for any j  1, gj+1  gj, where, for any j, gj =
1 F(j)
f(j) .
A mechanism in this extended model consists of a provision rule for the public good q :
(;) 7! q(;), which species how much of the public good is provided as a function of the
vector of taste parameters  and the rm's cost parameter , and a payment rule which species
for each individual i, a contribution to the cost of public good provision ti : (;) 7! ti(;).
The revelation principle implies that it entails no loss of generality to assume that indi-
viduals send messages about their taste parameters and that the rm sends a message about
its cost parameter, and that truth-telling constitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The incen-
tive compatibility conditions for individual i, are still given by the inequalities in (2), ex-
cept that Ti(^ i) and Qi(^ i) now also involve expectations about the rm's cost parameter; i.e.
Ti(^ i) := E[ti( i; ^ i;) j ^ i], and Qi(^ i) := E[q( i; ^ i;) j ^ i]. The incentive compatibility
constraints for the rm are as follows: For all , and all ^ ,
R()   K()  R(^ )   K(^ ) ; (10)
where R(^ ) := E
hPn
i=1 ti(; ^ ) j ^ 
i
is the rm's expected revenue conditional on announcing a
cost parameter ^ , and K(^ ) := E[k(q(; ^ )) j ^ ]. These constraints are based on the assumption
17that the rm is able to manipulate the production costs that are observable to outsiders. If
it claims a cost parameter ^  and has a true cost parameter , then its expected production
costs are equal to K(^ ). These production costs dier from those of a rm whose true cost
parameter equals ^ . This dierence, however, is assumed to be unobservable to anyone who is
an outsider to the rm.
We require that budget balance holds for each type of rm. Hence, for all ,
R()   K()  0 : (11)
To sum up, in the extended model with private information on preferences and production costs,
any mechanism has to satisfy the budget balance conditions in (11), the individual incentive
compatibility conditions in (2), and the rm's incentive compatibility conditions in (11). In
addition to these constraints, we may impose participation constraints for individuals in the ex
ante or the ex interim sense.
































This Proposition shows that private information on production costs aects the cost function
on which the analysis of constrained ecient mechanisms is based.16 In the basic model with
a commonly known technology , the expected costs of public good provision are given by




f() k(q(;)) j 
i
. This additional costs are due to the information rents that the rm is
able to realize.
The proof of Proposition 5, which is in the Appendix, follows from similar arguments as the
proof of Proposition 2. A necessary condition for constrained eciency is that, for a given public
goods provision rule, the expected payments of individuals are chosen such that E[
Pn
i=1 ti(;)]
is minimized subject to the rm's budget balance conditions in (11) and the rm's incentive
compatibility conditions in (10). Moreover, by analyzing a relaxed problem which minimizes
16For the extended model, we use the same denition of constrained eciency as in the basic model in which
 was assumed to be known, i.e., we follow Baron and Myerson (1982) in that only the expected payos of
individuals are of relevance and there is no weight given to rents that the rm may extract.
18E[
Pn
i=1 ti(;)] taking only the budget balance condition for the least ecient rms, i.e., those
with  = 1, and the local downward incentive compatibility conditions,
R(l)   lK(l)  R(l 1)   lK(l 1) :
into account, we nd that E[
Pn









Finally, we show that this lower bound can actually be obtained because the provision rule which
solves the relaxed problem satises the monotonicity constraint K(l)  K(l 1), for all l.









which takes account of the rm's information rent we can not only
reproduce Proposition 1, but all further results of Sections 3 and 4 in the extended model. In
particular, we obtain, once more the conclusions that (i) ex interim participation constraints
can only do harm to individuals if the mechanism designer is benevolent, and (ii) upon reducing
the mechanism designer's degree of benevolence, we eventually obtain a situation in which the
imposition of strong participation constraints is desirable.
In the following, we will show that a case for ex interim participation constraints arises
endogenously with an incomplete contracts perspective on public goods provision.
5.2 Incomplete Contracts
We now drop the assumption that there is a mechanism designer who species public goods
production and individual payments as a function of the rm's technology and the individuals'
preferences. Instead we assume that there is a regulator who delegates the task of adjusting
the nal allocation to the preference intensities of individuals to a prot-maximizing rm, in
exchange for an upfront payment that the rm has to deliver. We assume that the regulator is
benevolent and redistributes this payment to individuals.
The regulator diers from the mechanism designer in that he remains ignorant with respect to
the preferences of individuals and also with respect to the rm's operating prots; i.e., after the
rm has made its upfront payment it becomes the residual claimant and is no longer monitored
by the regulator. This arrangement is incomplete in the sense that the interaction between the
regulator and the rm is not made contingent on the public goods preferences of individuals.
In the basic model with a commonly known technology, this regulatory approach would make
it possible to reach ecient public goods provision. Given that the rm's expected prots are
known, the regulator can just require an upfront payment that equals the expected surplus from
ecient public goods provision. This would imply that individuals realize the same expected
payo as under the symmetric constrained ecient mechanism. Hence, they would legitimize
coercion at the constitutional ex ante stage. We will see, in the following, that this reasoning
breaks down if the rm has private information about its technology.
19The delegation of public goods provision to a self-interested rm is also of interest because it is
a common practice in reality. Public transportation is an example for which the question whether
the use of coercion is legitimate or not can be framed as follows: Should public transportation
be organized in such a way that the revenue from the tickets that are sold to customers cover all
of the costs, or is there a role for lump sum payments, i.e., for payments that individuals have
to deliver irrespective of whether or not they make use of public transportation. In the latter
case, there might be people who pay for public transportation, even though they never use it,
and who would hence be better o if there was no public transportation system at all.
Formally, we consider the following sequential structure. First, the rm learns its technol-
ogy and individuals learn their preferences. Then, the regulator asks the rm for an upfront
payment that may possibly depend on the rm's technology. Finally, the rm interacts with
individuals according to a prot-maximizing mechanism that has to satisfy incentive compati-
bility and participation constraints. Once more, we focus on the question whether, from an ex
ante perspective, individuals prefer the imposition of strong, ex interim participation constraints
over weak, ex ante participation constraints.
We assume, without loss of generality that the interaction between the rm and regulator
is based on a direct revelation mechanism such that the rm reports its cost parameter to the
regulator, and has to deliver a payment Sc(^ ) that is made contingent on its report. The index
c 2 fant;intg refers to the kind of participation constraint that has to be respected. We denote
the rm's prots by c().
An implication of the assumption that the regulator does not observe the rm's prots,
production costs, etc. is that the rm's upfront payment can not be made contingent on the
rm's cost parameter. To see this, consider two types of rms  and 0 who are both supposed
to produce the public good. Incentive compatibility requires that
c()   Sc()  c()   Sc(0) and c(0)   Sc(0)  c(0)   Sc() :
These inequalities imply that Sc() = Sc(0). In words, if there is a rm of who is supposed to
produce the public good and the rm knows that, if it was less productive, it would still become
the producer of the public good, then it will reveal its high productivity level only if its payment
is not higher than the the one it had to pay if it was less productive. In the following we can
therefore drop the dependence of the upfront payment on the rm's type, and interpret Sc as
an entry fee that each rm who wants to become the producer of the public good has to pay.
We assume in the following that the upfront payment is set in such a way that each type of
rm participates, i.e., Sc is such that even the rm with the worst technology and therefore the
lowest prots is willing to participate,
c(1)   Sc  0 :
20In principle, the regulator could require an upfront payment that exceeds c(1). This
would imply that a rm with a bad technology would refrain from becoming the provider of
the public good, so that there would be no public good provision. From an ex post perspective,
this would be an inecient outcome because even if  is very high, the marginal cost of public
goods provision converges to zero as the provision level converges to zero. Hence, even with a
bad technology, it would be desirable to have a strictly positive public goods supply. However,
the advantage of choosing Sc strictly larger than c(1) is that it makes it possible to extract a
larger fraction of the prots of rms with a better technology. In general, this tradeo between
eciency considerations on the one hand and the desirability of rent extraction on the other,
need not be such that it is optimal to have a positive supply of public goods with each type of
rm. However, if the probability f1 of facing a rm with a bad technology is suciently high,
then the scope for rent extraction is limited anyway and the regulator will choose the upfront
payment such that Sc  c(1).
Remark 3 An alternative foundation for this assumption would be that the regulator faces a
commitment problem. The intuition is as follows: Suppose that the regulator sets an upfront
payment that is so high that not all types of the rm are willing to enter. Also, suppose that
the regulator nds himself in the situation that indeed entry has not occurred. Then he knows
that if he lowers the entry fee, eventually the rm will be ready to enter and that this will create
a strictly positive surplus. Lack of commitment means that the regulator is unable to resist
this temptation. Anticipating this behavior, the rm will be willing to produce the public good
only if the payment has been reduced to a level such that each type of rm would be willing to
participate. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a rigorous game-theoretic analysis
of the relationship between the regulator and the rm in the absence of commitment. In the
context of a buyer-seller relationship, these considerations have been formalized by Hart and
Tirole (1988); see also Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
For the purposes of this paper, the assumption Sc  c(1), is made for ease of exposition.
As will become clear, it is a sucient condition that makes it possible to show that, with an
incomplete contracts perspective, we may nd a role for strong participation constraints.
Proposition 6 For suciently large 1, the use of coercion is not legitimate, and public goods
provision should be distorted downwards.
If 1 is large this implies that the least productive rm makes hardly any prot. Given that the
prots of the least productive rm provide an upper bound on the entry fee that the regulator
21charges, this implies that the entry fee converges to zero as 1 goes out of bounds. Consequently,
all other rms can keep the whole prot from public goods provision for themselves. Given this
observation, the arguments from the previous section imply that coercion is not legitimate and
that the rm should face strong, ex interim participation constraints.
Hence, the analysis of the incomplete contracts model can be summarized as follows: If
public goods provision is delegated to a prot-maximizing rm, and moreover, the rm may
credibly claim that its maximal prot is close to zero, then the use of coercion for public goods
nance is not legitimate; i.e., the rm must not be given access to external funds in order to
cover its production costs.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Ex interim participation constraints. We rst consider expected payos of the rm and
of individuals if ex interim participation constraints have to be respected. A straightforward
extension of the analysis in Section 4 implies that the expected net prots (taking the upfront














q()   k(q()) j  = l
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  Sint ; (12)
where Q is the set of functions from n to R+. An individual's expected utility at the ex ante









e(;) is the level of
public goods provision that results from the prot maximization problem in (12), if the vector
of taste parameters equals  and the cost parameter equals .
As in Section 4, the imposition of ex interim participation constraints implies that individuals
get an information rent. This information rent reduces the revenues that a prot-maximizing
rm can realize. As a consequence, the rm chooses a second-best public goods provision level
which falls short of the surplus-maximizing rst best level. The information rent also enters the
expected payo of individuals. In addition, each individual gets an equal share of the upfront
payment that the rm has to deliver.
Ex ante participation constraints. We can also extend the analysis of Section 4 to
determine expected prots and payos if ex ante participation constraints are imposed. A type











q()   k(q()) j  = l
#!
  Sant ; (13)
where Sant  ant(1) is the upfront payment in a model with ex ante participation constraints.
The expected utility of individual i is equal to Uant
i := 1
nSant.
With the weaker ex ante participation constraints, the rm is able to extract higher payments
from individuals. Individuals no longer get an information rent, which implies that the rm
22chooses a surplus-maximizing public goods provision level q
e(;). The expected payo of
individuals is entirely due to the rm's upfront payment.
Legitimacy of coercion. The use of coercion for public goods nance is legitimate if the















We seek to show that this condition is violated for suciently large 1. This follows from the
observation that both ant(1) and int(1) converge to 0 as 1 goes to 1. To see this, note












Hence, as  goes out of bounds, optimal quantities and expected prots go to zero. This implies











The analysis has provided an answer to the question whether the nancing of public goods should
be subject to participation constraints. The advantage of a system based on participation con-
straints is that all individuals benet from public goods provision. The disadvantage, however,
is that public goods nance is generally insucient to induce ecient outcomes. Which of these
two forces is dominating depends on whether or not there are pronounced agency problems be-
tween individuals and the institution in charge of public goods provision. If the latter acts in the
individuals' best interests, then the imposition on participation constraint is not attractive. By
contrast, if it seeks to maximize his own payo at the expense of individuals, then participation
constraints should be imposed. Finally, we have shown that, under certain assumptions, if the
production of public goods is delegated to a monopolistic rm with private information about
its production costs, the latter case applies; that is, a regulated monopolist should not be given
access to public funds.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Only if - part. We show that for every constrained ecient mechanism the budget constraint is binding
and the provision rule is surplus-maximizing.
Without loss of generality of we can characterize a Parto-ecient mechanism as the solution of the
following optimization problem: Choose a mechanism in order to maximize E[1q()   t1()] subject
to the incentive compatibility constraints in (2), the budget constraint in (1) and the following set of
reservation utility constraints: For each i 6= 1,
E[iq()   ti()]   ui ; (15)
for some given vector of reservation utility levels ( u2;:::;  un).
Consider a relaxed problem which does not include the incentive compatibility constraints. As is well-
known in the literature the solution to this relaxed problem is such that the budget constraint in (1) and
the constraints in (15) are binding. Moreover, public goods provision has to be surplus-maximizing. In the
following we show that this solution can also be achieved subject to incentive compatibility constraints.
The surplus-maximizing provision rule satises q( i;l) < q( i;l+1), for all i and l. This implies
that for all i, and all l, the monotonicity constrained Qi(l+1) > Qi(l), is satised.
Given this provision rule, if we choose the expected payments of each individual i in such a way that
all local downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding,
lQi(l)   Ti(l) = lQi(l 1)   Ti(l 1);
25then Lemma 2 in the supplementary material for this paper implies that the resulting allocation is
incentive compatible, and Lemma 3 in the supplementary material implies that the expected utility of
individual i is given by
















  Ti(0) =  ui
and for all l > 0,
Ti(l) = l(Qi(l)   Qi(l 1)) + Ti(l 1) ;
then the resulting allocation is incentive compatible and yields for each individual i 6= 1, the same
expected utility as the solution of the relaxed problem. We proceed in a similar way with individual 1,
except that the utility level for individual 1, u












 ui : (16)
It remains to be shown that the payments are such that the budget constraint holds as an equality. By
construction, E[ti()] = E[iq()]    ui, for i 6= 1, and E[t1()] = E[1q()]   u






















= E [k(q())] :
If-Part. We now show that every incentive compatible mechanism such that the provision rule is
surplus-maximizing and the budget constraint holds as an equality is constrained ecient.
The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that (q;t1;:::;tn) is an incentive compatible mecha-
nism such that q is surplus-maximizing and the budget constraint holds as an equality. Suppose there
exists an incentive compatible mechanism (q0;t0
1;:::;t0
n) such that, for all i,
E[iq0()   t0
i()]  E[iq()   ti()] ;















Using that E [
Pn
i=1 ti())] = E[k(q())], and that E [
Pn
i=1 t0














hence a contradiction to the assumption that q is a surplus-maximizing provision rule.
26A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Only if - part. By Proposition 1, under every constrained ecient mechanism the provision rule is equal
to q. Given this provision rule, Lemma 7 in the supplementary material for this paper implies that the













If this is smaller than E[k(q())], budget balance can not be achieved. Hence, constrained eciency
can not be achieved.













then, given the surplus-maximizing provision rule q, (t1;:::;tn) can be chosen such that the budget
constraint binds and that for all i, the incentive compatibility constraints and the ex interim participation
constraints are satised.
By the arguments in the proof of Lemma 7, the participation constraints of individual i are satised
if and only if Ti(0)  0. Since the provision rule q implies that the monotonicity constraints Qi(l) 
Qi(l 1) are satised for all i and l, Lemmas 2 and 3 in the supplementary material imply that incentive
compatibility holds if expected payments are chosen such that all local downward incentive compatibility



























for all i. By assumption this is smaller or equal to zero, so that the ex interim participation constraints are
































A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1. At a solution to the second best problem, the budget constraint has to be binding. Otherwise it
would be possible to reduce the expected payments of individuals without violating any of the incentive
compatibility or participation constraints, and without violating the budget constraint. Hence, at a
















27Step 2. The expected revenue E[
Pn
















This follows from the arguments in the proof of Lemma 7 in the supplementary material, which imply, that
if, for a given provision rule q, E[
Pn
i=1 ti()] is maximized taking only a subset of the constraints of the
second best problem { namely the ex interim participation constraints and the local downward incentive











This expression is therefore an upper bound on the expected payments of individuals. Combining this












 E[k(q())] : (17)
Step 3. Steps 1 and 2 imply that the surplus that is generated at a solution of the auxiliary problem to
maximize E [(
P
i=1 i)q()   k(q())] subject to the constraint in (17) is an upper bound on the second













Step 4. Suppose that (17) is not binding. Then provision rule q and the payments in the mechanism in
the proof of the if-part of Proposition 2 solve the auxiliary problem. Moreover, with this mechanism the
surplus of public goods provision is shared equally among individuals, i.e., for all i,










This proves the rst statement in Proposition 3.
Step 5. Now suppose that (17) is binding. The provision rule that solves the auxiliary problem
satises the monotonicity constraint, Qi(l)  Qi(l 1), for all i, and l. This follows because the optimal











where  is the multiplier on the constraint. The assumption that the hazard rate is decreasing implies
that whenever, for one individual the taste parameter l is replaced by the taste parameter l+1, the
right hand side goes up, which implies that q( i;l)  q( i;l+1), for all i,  i, and l. This implies,
in particular, that Qi(l)  Qi(l 1), for all i, and l. This follows from Lemma 7 in the supplementary
material for this paper. This implies that the the surplus that is generated by the auxiliary problem can
be achieved by a second best mechanism. Moreover, the arguments in the proof of this Lemma show
that this requires that for all i, the ex interim Participation constraint Ti(0)  0 and all local downward
incentive compatibility constraints are binding. Lemma 3 in the supplementary material implies that, at
a solution to the second best problem, for all i, ex ante expected utility is equal to







28where q() is the provision rule that solves the auxiliary problem. Given that the constraint of the






























Using that the random variables (i)n



















Equations (18) and (19) imply that at a solution to the second best problem,












By denition of the surplus-maximizing provision rule q, q 6= q implies that this is less than the ex
ante expected payo under the symmetric constraint ecient mechanism.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof uses arguments from the supplementary material for this paper, in particular Lemmas 1
- 7, which provide a characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms and of revenue-maximizing
mechanisms.
The optimal mechanism with ex interim participation constraints. It follows from Lemma
5, that, at a solution to the mechanism design problem, for all i, the participation constraints in (3) are
binding for i = 0 and is slack otherwise. Otherwise it would be possible to increase the monopolist's
revenue while holding the monopolist's provision rule xed.
Consider the relaxed problem of choosing (q;t1;:::;tn) in order to maximize  subject to the down-
ward incentive compatibility constraints, for any l > 0,
lQi(l)   Ti(l)  lQi(l 1)   Ti(l 1) : (20)
and the ex interim participation constraints in (3). It follows from Lemma 6 that at a solution to this
problem, all downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding, and the participation constraint
in (3) is binding for i = 0 and is slack otherwise. Otherwise it would be possible to increase the
monopolist's revenue while holding the monopolist's provision rule xed. But then the arguments in
the proof of Lemma 7 imply that the expected revenue of the monopolist, at a solution to the relaxed
problem, is equal to E [
Pn










. Hence, the provision rule which is













In the following this provision rule is denoted by q
 .
29The relaxed problem takes only a subset of all incentive compatibility constraints into account. Hence,
the expected prots that are generated by the mechanism which solves the relaxed problem are an upper
bound on the expected prots that are generated by the mechanism that solves the \full" problem of
maximizing  subject to all participation and incentive compatibility constraints.
It follows from Lemma 2 that if the provision rule q
 is such that the monotonicity constraints
Qi(l)  Qi(l 1) are satised for all i and l, then the solution to the relaxed problem satises all
incentive compatibility constraints and is hence also a solution to the full problem.
In the remainder we verify that under q
 the monotonicity constraints are indeed satised. For every
given , q









 ()) ; (21)
or, if this equation has only a negative solution, equal to 0. Given that hl < hl 1, for all l, for each i,
the left-hand side of the rst order condition is strictly increasing in i. Given that k is increasing and
convex, this implies that, for each i and each l, q
 ( i;l) < q
 ( i;l+1), and, as a consequence, the
monotonicity constraint Qi(l+1) > Qi(l) holds for all i, and all l.
Given that all local downward incentive compatibility constraints and the participation constraints























Exploiting that the random variables (i)n
i=1 are iid and rearranging term yields the expression for
expected payos of individuals in equation (8).
The optimal mechanism with ex ante participation constraints We rst consider a re-
laxed problem of maximizing  taking only the ex ante participation constraints in (4) into account.
Obviously, this implies that, for each i, the participation constraint has to be binding, for each i,
E[ti()] = E[iq()]. Using this expression to substitute for E[ti()] in the denition of  yields
 = E [(
Pn
i=1 i)q()   k(q())]. Hence, q is the prot-maximizing provision rule.
In the following we show that the there is a mechanism which is payo equivalent to the solution of
this relaxed problem and satises all incentive compatibility constraints.
The surplus-maximizing provision rule q is such that for each i, Qi(l)  Qi(l+1). If all local down-
ward incentive compatibility constraints hold as an equality, then all incentive compatibility constraints
are satised. This follows from Lemma 2. To complete the proof it suces show that, given public goods
provision according to q, there is a payo equivalent mechanism which is such that all local downward
incentive compatibility constraints hold as an equality.
If all local downward incentive constraints are binding, then the arguments in the proof of Lemma 2
imply that Ti(l) = lQi(l)  
Pl 1















, then also the ex ante participation constraints of
all individuals are binding. This also implies that for each individual E[iq() ti()] = 0 and expected
30prots are equal to  = E [(
Pn
i=1 i)q()   k(q())]. The ex ante expected payo of individuals
consists entirely of the fraction of prots that they receive. This observation yields the expression for
expected utility in equation (9).


































Since q maximizes the surplus from public goods provision, this expression is increasing in . Moreover,
it is negative for  close to zero and positive for  close to 1.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Step 1. We show that, for any mechanism satisfying the the budget balance conditions in (11) and the
rm's incentive compatibility conditions in (10), E [
Pn









Let q be an arbitrary given provision rule and consider the relaxed problem of minimizing the expected
payments of individuals E [
Pn
i=1 ti(;)] subject to the budget balance condition for  = 1 and the local
downward incentive compatibility conditions for the rm, R(l)   lK(l)  R(l 1)   lK(l 1), for
all l. Since this minimization problem takes only a subset of all budget balance conditions and all rm
incentive compatibility conditions into account, the solution of this minimization problem will be a lower
bound to the minimal value of E [
Pn
i=1 ti(;)] that can be obtained if all budget and incentive constraints
are taken into account.
At a solution to the relaxed problem all constraints have to be binding. Otherwise it was possible
to reduce the expected revenues for some type of rm without violating any of the constraints of the
relaxed problem, thereby attaining a lower value of E [
Pn
i=1 ti(;)]. This makes it possible to verify
that R(l) = lK(l) +
Pl 1
j=1 K(j), for l 2 f1;:::;r   1g, and that R(1) = 1K(1). Using the law




































Step 2. Suppose public goods provision is such that the following monotonicity constraint holds:
For all l, K(l)  K(l 1). We show that, under this assumption, there is a mechanism such that
E [
Pn








, satisfying the budget balance conditions in (11) and the
rm's incentive compatibility conditions in (10),
Using arguments that are analogous to those in the proof of Lemma 4 the supplementary material
for this paper, we nd that if the rm's budget balance condition holds for  = 1, then it also holds
31for all  6= 1. The fact that all local downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding and that
the monotonicity constraint K(l)  K(l 1) holds for all l, implies that all rm incentive compatibility
conditions are satised. This follows from similar arguments as Lemmas 1 and 2 in the supplementary
material.
Given Steps 1 and 2, the arguments that are needed to complete the proof of Proposition 5 are a
straightforward modication of the arguments that were used to in the proof of Proposition 1. Hence,
we only sketch the arguments.

















we obtain the following result: A mechanism is Pareto-ecient among those that satisfy the individuals'
incentive compatibility conditions as well as the budget constraint (23) if and only if the constraint (23)
















Denote this provision rule in the following by q
e.
To obtain this result we need to show that the lower bound on payments identied in Step 1 can be
reached. By Step 2, this is the case if q
e is such that for all l, K(l)  K(l 1). To verify this property,
note that, for any (;), q








By the monotone hazard rate assumption the left hand side is decreasing in . Hence, conditional on ,
a larger value of  implies that less of the public good is provided. Given our assumption that l < l 1,
this means that, for every , q
e(;l) > q
e(;l 1). This implies, in particular that K(l)  K(l 1).
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1 Characterization of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
Lemma 1 For all i, the incentive constraints in (2) hold if the following local incentive constraints are
satised: For any l < m,
lQi(l)   Ti(l)  lQi(l+1)   Ti(l+1) ; (1)
and, for any l > 0,
lQi(l)   Ti(l)  lQi(l 1)   Ti(l 1) : (2)
Moreover, the local incentive constraints (1) and (2) imply that, for all i, Qi(l)  Qi(l 1), for all l > 1.
Proof We rst show that for each i and for each l, Qi(l)  Qi(l 1). This follows from adding (1) for
i = l (as stated in the Lemma) and (2) for i = l+1,
l+1Qi(l+1)   Ti(l+1)  l+1Qi(l)   Ti(l) :
We now show that (1) implies that
lQi(l)   Ti(l)  lQi(l+2)   Ti(l+2) ; (3)
To see this, rewrite (1) as
lQi(l)   Ti(l)  l+1Qi(l+1)   Ti(l+1)   (l+1   l)Qi(l+1) ;
Since Qi(l+2)  Qi(l+1) we also have
lQi(l)   Ti(l)  l+1Qi(l+1)   Ti(l+1)   (l+1   l)Qi(l+2) ;
Moreover, condition (1) for i = l+1 is
l+1Qi(l+1)   Ti(l+1)  l+1Qi(l+2)   Ti(l+2) ;
1Adding the last two inequalities yields
lQi(l)   Ti(l)  lQi(l+2)   Ti(l+2)
Hence, an individual with preference parameter l does not benet from announcing l+2. Iterating this
argument one more establishes that this individual does neither benet from announcing l+3, etc.
The proof that an individual with preference parameter l does not benet from announcing l j for any
j  1 is analogous and left to the reader.
Lemma 2 Suppose that, for some individual i, all local downward incentive compatibility constraints
are binding and that Qi(l)  Qi(l 1), for all l > 1. Then all incentive compatibility constraints of
individual i are satised.





k(Qi(k)   Qi(k 1)) + Ti(0) : (4)
Using that 0 = 0 and that l+1   l = 1, for all l > 0, equation (4) can be equivalently written as
Ti(l) = lQi(l)  
l 1 X
k=0
Qi(k) + Ti(0) : (5)
To establish incentive compatibility, Lemma 1 implies that it suces to show that all local upward
incentive compatibility constraints are satised, i.e., for all l,
lQi(l)   Ti(l)  lQi(l+1)   Ti(l+1) :
or, equivalently,
lQi(l)   Ti(l)  l+1Qi(l+1)   Ti(l+1)   Qi(l+1) :






Qi(k)   Qi(l+1) ;
or
Qi(l+1)  Qi(l) :
These monotonicity constraints are satised by assumption.
Lemma 3 If for individual i, all local downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding, then the
2expected utility of individual i from the ex ante perspective is given by







































pj Qi(j) + Ti(0)








2 Characterization of Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms for a
given provision rule
Lemma 4 For all i, if the participation constraint in (3) is satised for i = 0 then it is also satised
for all i 6= 0.
Proof Let i 6= 0. Then, by the incentive compatibility constraints in (2),
iQi(i)   Ti(i)  iQi(0)   Ti(0) :
Moreover, i > 0 implies that the right-hand side of this inequality exceeds
0Qi(0)   Ti(0) ;
which is nonnegative by the participation constraint for i = 0. This proves that (3) is not binding for
i 6= 0.
Lemma 5 Let q be an arbitrary given provision rule. Consider the problem of choosing a mechanism







subject to subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (2) and the ex interim participation con-
straints in (3). At a solution to this problem, the participation constraint in (3) is binding for i = 0
and is slack otherwise.
3Proof By Lemma 4 we only need to show that it is binding for i = 0. We show that it is possible
to increase the expected payments of individual i in an incentive compatible way if, for some i, the
participation constraint for i = 0 does not hold as an equality. It is instructive to rewrite the incentive
compatibility constraints in (2) as follows: For each i, for each i 2 , and for each ^ i 2 ,
iQi(i)   iQi(^ i)  Ti(i)   Ti(^ i); (6)
Consider a new payment rule for individual i such that for each i 2 , Ti(i) increases by some  > 0,
this implies that the right hand side of the incentive constraints in (6) remains constant, i.e., the increase
of i's expected payments does not upset incentive compatibility. Since revenue increase in the expected
payments of individual i, the revenue maximizing mechanism must be such that a binding participation
constraint for i = 0 prevents a further increase of individual i's payments.
Lemma 6 Let q be an arbitrary given provision rule. Consider the \relaxed problem" of choosing a







subject to the downward incentive compatibility constraints in (2) and the ex interim participation con-
straints in (3). At a solution to this problem, all downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding,
and the participation constraint in (3) is binding for i = 0 and is slack otherwise.
Proof It is straightforward to verify that, for all i, all downward incentive compatibility constraints are
binding. Otherwise the expected payments of some individual could be increased without violating any
one of the constraints of the relaxed problem. It remains to be shown that, for all i, the participation
constraint in (3) is binding for i = 0 and is slack otherwise. By Lemma 4 we only need to show that, for
all i, the participation constraint in (3) is binding for i = 0. Suppose otherwise. Then it was possible
to increase Ti(0) without violating any constraint.
Lemma 7 Let q be a given provision rule with the property that for all i, and all l, the monotonicity
constraints Qi(l)  Qi(l 1) are satised. Consider the problem of choosing (t1;:::;tn) in order to







subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (2) and the ex interim participation constraints in













Proof First, consider the \relaxed problem" of maximizing subject to the local downward incentive
constraints (2) and the the ex interim participation constraints in (3). The arguments in the proofs of
4Lemmas 4 - 6 imply that, for all i, all local downward incentive constraints as well as the ex interim
participation constraints are binding for i = 0.1
Since the given provision rule q satises the monotonicity constraints Qi(l)  Qi(l 1) for all i and
l, Lemma 2 implies that all incentive compatibility constraints are satised at a solution to the relaxed
problem. Hence, the solution to the relaxed problem is the revenue maximizing mechanism.

























3 On the impossibility to reach constrained eciency subject
to interim participation constraints with many individuals
Lemma 8 Let (kn)1
n=1 be a sequence of cost functions, with the understanding that kn is the cost function
that applies if the number of individuals is equal to n. Suppose that the sequence (kn)1
n=1 converges
pointwise to a cost function k1. Let q
n be the surplus maximizing provision rule for an economy with n
individuals. Suppose that (kn)1






n())] > 0 :






































By the strong law of large numbers 1
n
Pn























































To complete the proof, note that q
n() converges in probability to a deterministic public goods provision
level. This follows since (i) for every given n, q









i=1 i converges in probability to E[i], and (iii) (kn)1
n=1 converges pointwise to
k1.





















In conjunction with Lemma 8 this implies that for suciently large n, constrained eciency is incompat-
ible with the ex interim participation constraints.
4 A model with prot-sharing ex post
The basic model is such that individuals receive a share 
n of the expected monopoly prots which does
not depend on their behavior under the mechanism that the monopolist proposes. In this section of
the Appendix we investigate an alternative model which is such that individuals receive a share of the
prots that the mechanism designer realizes ex post and which therefore depends on the vector of taste
parameters . This implies that an individual's incentives under the mechanism are complicated by the
dependence of prots on the own announcement. The incentive compatibility constraints are now as
follows: for each i, for each i 2 , and for each ^ i 2 ,
iQi(i)   Ti(i) +

n









ti( i; ^ i)   k(q( i; ^ i)) j ^ i
#
are the expected prots from the perspective of individual i.
We want to show in the following that (i) this model is well-dened only if prots are included in the
participation constraints i.e., the participation constraints are such that, for all i and all i
iQi(i)   Ti(i) +

n
i(i)  0 (8)
as opposed to
iQi(i)   Ti(i)  0 ; (9)
and (ii) that if the model is well dened, then it gives the same results as the basic model under the
assumption that  = 0.
6Proposition 1 The mechanism that maximizes  subject to the incentive constraints in (7), and the
interim participation constraints (8) has the following properties.
i) For all i, the participation constraint for i = 0 is binding and the participation constraints for
i 6= 0 are not binding.
ii) For all i, all local downward incentive constraints are binding; i.e., for all l > 0,
lQi(l)   Ti(l) +

n




and all other incentive compatibility constraints are not binding.
iii) The prot maximizing provision rule is given by q
 .
iv) For all  < 1, the expected after tax prots are given as









 ()   k(q
 ())
#









4.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows from the series of Lemmas below.
Lemma 9 For all i, the participation constraint in (8) is binding if i = 0 and is slack otherwise.
Proof Let i 6= 0. Then, by the incentive compatibility constraints in (7),
iQi(i)   Ti(i) +

n




Moreover, i > 0 implies that the right-hand side of this inequality exceeds




which is nonnegative by the participation constraint for i = 0, and the fact that the maximal prot-level
is non-negative because the monopolist can always ensure zero prots by choosing q  0. This proves
that (8) is not binding for i 6= 0.
Now suppose that i = 0. We show that it is possible to increase the expected payments of individual
i in an incentive compatible way if, for some i, the participation constraint for i = 0 does not hold as
an equality. It is instructive to rewrite the incentive compatibility constraints in (7) as follows: For each





























tj( i; ^ i)   k(q( i; ^ i)) j ^ i
3
5
does not include the payments of individual i. (10) can equivalently be written as: For each i, for each















(Ti(i)   Ti(^ i)); (11)
Now x the provision rule for the public good and the payments of all individuals j, j 6= i. This implies
that for all of the incentive constraints in (11), the left hand side remains constant. Now, if the monopolist
chooses a new payment rule for individual i such that for each i 2 , Ti(i) increases by some  > 0,
this implies that also the right hand side of the incentive constraints in (11) remains constant, i.e., the
increase of i's expected payments does not upset incentive compatibility. Since monopoly prots increase
in the expected payments of individual i, the prot-maximizing mechanism must be such that a binding
participation constraint for i = 0 prevents a further increase of individual i's payments.
Lemma 10 For all i, the incentive constraints in (7) hold if the following local incentive constraints are
satised: For any l < m,
lQi(l)   Ti(l) +

n




and, for any l > 0,
lQi(l)   Ti(l) +

n




Moreover, the local incentive constraints (12) and (13) imply that, for all i, Qi(l)  Qi(l 1), for all
l > 1.
Proof We rst show that for each i and for each l, Qi(l)  Qi(l 1). This follows from adding (12)
and the (13) constraint for i = l+1, which is given by
l+1Qi(l+1)   Ti(l+1) +

n




We now show that (12) implies that
lQi(l)   Ti(l) +

n




To see this, rewrite (12) as
lQi(l)   Ti(l) +

n
i(l)  l+1Qi(l+1)   Ti(l+1) +

n
i(l+1)   (l+1   l)Qi(l+1) ;
Since Qi(l+2)  Qi(l+1) we also have
lQi(l)   Ti(l) +

n
i(l)  l+1Qi(l+1)   Ti(l+1) +

n
i(l+1)   (l+1   l)Qi(l+2) ;
8Moreover, condition (12) for i = l+1 is
l+1Qi(l+1)   Ti(l+1) +

n




Adding the last two inequalities yields
lQi(l)   Ti(l) +

n




Hence, an individual with preference parameter l does not benet from announcing l+2. Iterating this
argument one more establishes that this individual does neither benet from announcing l+3, etc.
The proof that an individual with preference parameter l does not benet from announcing l j for any
j  1 is analogous and left to the reader.
Lemma 11 At a solution to the monopoly problem, all local downward incentive compatibility constraints
are binding, all other incentive compatibility constraints are not binding, and the expected payments of













Proof Step 1. We rst consider the \relaxed problem" of maximizing  subject to the local downward
incentive constraints (13), the binding participation constraints for individuals with i = 0, and the
following monotonicity constraints: for all i, Qi(l)  Qi(l 1), for all l > 1.
If one of the downward incentive constraints was not binding, then the expected payments of some
individual could be increased without violating any one of the constraints of the relaxed problem. Hence,










+ Ti(0) : (16)
From the fact that participation constraints are binding whenever i = 0, it follows that Ti(0) = i(0).
Using that 0 = 0 and that l+1   l = 1, for all l > 0, equation (16) can be equivalently written as





























































Step 2. To complete the proof, Lemmas 9-10 imply that it suces to show that the solution to the relaxed
problem satises all local upward incentive compatibility constraints, i.e., for all i, and all l,
lQi(l)   Ti(l) +

n





lQi(l)   Ti(l) +

n
i(l)  l+1Qi(l+1)   Ti(l+1) +

n
i(l+1)   Qi(l+1) :






Qi(k)   Qi(l+1) ;
or
Qi(l+1)  Qi(l) :
These monotonicity constraints are satised at a solution of the relaxed problem.
Lemma 12 At a solution to the monopoly problem, expected after tax prots are given as




















Proof Using Lemma 11 to substitute for E [
Pn
i=1 ti()] in the denition of , (see equation (??)) and
collecting terms gives the result for after tax prots. Using 11 to substitute for E [ti()] in




gives the result for individual i's expected payo.
4.2 Participation Constraints that do not include monopoly prots
We now discuss briey how the analysis changes if instead of the participation constraints in (8) those
in (9) that do not include prots, need to be satised. The analysis of this problem requires only minor
adjustments, relative to the proof of Proposition 1. Adjusting the arguments in the proof of Lemma 9,
implies that
Ti(0) = 0: (18)
10This yields the following modications in Lemma 11. The expected payments of individual i ex interim,
provided that i 6= 0, are now given as


























Substituting these expected payments into the denition of  implies that

















Now it is easy to verify that the mechanism designer may choose the mechanism such that (0) is
arbitrarily small and hence E[ti()] is arbitrarily large even if Ti(0) = 0 and all local downward incentive
compatibility constraints are binding.2 Consequently, after tax prots are unbounded and the prot-
maximization problem is no longer well dened.
5 A model in which expected prots are included in the partic-
ipation constraints
The following proposition claries how the analysis in Section 4 would be modied if instead of the ex
interim participation constraints in (3) that do not include monopoly prots the ex interim participation
constraints in (7) are imposed.
Proposition 2 The mechanism that maximizes  subject to the incentive constraints in (2), and the
interim participation constraints (7) has the following properties.
i) The pattern of binding participation and incentive compatibility constraints and the prot-maximizing
provision rule are as in Proposition 1.
ii) The monopolists expected after tax prots, are for all , given as






















The proposition establishes a neutrality result. The parameter  neither has an inuence on the op-
timal mechanism nor on the distribution of payos between the monopolist and the consumers of the
2Suppose that there are only two individuals, n = 2, and only two possible preference parameters, m = 1. The monopolist
can choose q() = 0, for all  and still choose the payments t1() and t2() such that he makes an unbounded prot, even
though incentive and participation constraints have to be satised.
11public good. The reason is that, whatever , the mechanism designer will ensure that the lowest type's





for all i. Consequently, a higher , implies that the mechanism designer can rise the expected payment
of individuals with the lowest possible valuation, so that their ex interim expected utility level is equal
to 0. Given that the lowest types have an expected utility level of 0, all higher types can only get the
information rent that is due to their private information on their preferences. Hence, whatever , their







An implication of these observations is that the model with monopoly prots in the participation
constraints yields exactly the same results as the model without monopoly prots in the participation
constraints under the additional assumption that, in the latter model,  = 0. Hence, without loss of
generality, we may focus on the model with participation constraints that do not include monopoly
prots.3
5.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 is very similar to the characterization of the prot maximizing mechanism
with ex interim participation constraints in the proof of Proposition ??. In the following, we only sketch
the steps where the arguments from the proof of Proposition ?? require some modication. Adjusting





A straightforward modication of Lemma 7 implies that individual i's expected payments from the ex

























After plugging the prot maximizing provision rule q
























 ()   k(q())
#
Finally, to solve for the the ex ante expected payo of individual i, rearrange equation (22) to obtain









Upon substituting the prot-maximizing provision rule q
 into this formula we obtain the statement in
the Proposition.
3Proposition 2 can also be proven for the model with ex ante instead of ex interim participation constraints. The details
are left to the reader.
12